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NARROWING THE GAP BY NARROWING THE FIELD:
WHAT'S MISSING FROM THE MAcCRATE REPORT-OF
SKILLS, LEGAL SCIENCE AND BEING A HUMAN BEING
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
Et tu, Brute?!
from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar
I. INTRODUCTION: OF FALSE POLARITIES-THINKING LIKE
A LAWYER AND DOING LIKE A LAWYER
I come here today, not to bury the MacCrate Report,' but to criticize
it, not for what it includes, although that is part of my critique, but for
what it leaves out. I also want to situate my critique in the contentious
intellectual history of legal education and legal scholarship,2 that, in my
view, has too long polarized both the intellectual value and rigor of
"law" (conceived of either as doctrine or theory) and "skills" (those nasty
things that real lawyers have to do to express "the law" and represent
clients). Among the most recent entries to this debate is a work I will
juxtapose to the MacCrate Report, Anthony Kronman's, The Lost
Lawyer,3 which argues, in its powerful section on law schools, for
another dualistic conception of legal education: "scientific realism", and
its progeny of the abstract theories of law and economics and critical
*Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law Center 1994. I
have benefited from conversations and presentations about the ideas expressed herein at the
Washington Law Review Symposium on the 21st Century Lawyer, April 16, 1994, and with the
faculties, students, and others at Georgetown University Law Center, George Washington National
Law Center, DePaul University College of Law, and with colleagues at UCLA.
1. Section on Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Ass'n, Legal Education and
Professional Development-An Educational Continuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
2. There are many versions of these old debates, see, e.g., Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 90
Yale L.J. (1981); Symposium on Legal Education, 91 Mich. L. R. (1993); Symposium, Civic and
Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. (1993) Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America
From the 1850s to the 1980s (1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Too Little Theory, Too Little Practice:
Steven's Law School, 1985 An. B. Found. Res. J. 675 (1985) (review essay); Harry Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34
(1992); M.H. Hoeflich, Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est La Meme Chose: The Integration of Theory and
Practice in Legal Education, 66 Temple L.Q. 123 (1993); George Priest, The Increasing Division
Between Legal Practice and Legal Education, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 681.
3. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1994).
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legal studies, and "prudential realism," which focuses on the lawyer's
judgment, experience, feeling, and character, as well as reason.
In elaborating my critique of the MacCrate Report I want to suggest
that it expresses a certain irony for a "skills-of-lawyering" oriented
document. I read the MacCrate Report as attempting the kind of
taxonomic, scientistic, classificatory, and schematic thinking about
lawyering that comes closer to a Langdellian statement of "scientifically
derived principles"4 about lavyering than any area of doctrinal law has
accomplished.' It is thus, too over-determined, too rigid and, at the same
time, too incomplete for me. It enacts a particular picture of the lawyer,
as principally a litigator, a "means-ends" thinker who maximizes an
abstracted client's goals.6 It also assumes or subsumes a particular view
of the legal system as an adversarial one in which the best of all worlds is
achieved if everyone and everyone's lawyer looks out for themselves.
Thus, while attempting to clarify and codify a view of the lawyer that can
be "taught" in either law school or continuing legal education, the
MacCrate Report encodes a particular image or vision of a lawyer, one
that I find troubling and incomplete. As an intellectual matter, the
attempt to clarify and formulate a "Statement of Fundamental Lawyering
Skills and Professional Values" exposes the narrowness of the Task
Force's thinking about lawyering and, in my view, fails to deal with all
4. Discussions of whether the Langdellian method is inductive or deductive are often confusing
and incomplete. Some focus on the Socratic method and see the process as deductive application of
general principles, see, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal
Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1627, 1629 (1993); see also Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to
Lawyers?, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1759 (1993). To the extent that rules or principles are derived from
reading the cases, the process is inductive (though what is considered relevant is also political, as
well as "logical"). When the principles or rules thus derived are then applied to a new fact situation
the process becomes deductive, with a continuing political, as well as logical, process of considering
which facts are relevant or "determinative." Thank you, Anita Allen, my colleague at Georgetown.
The image that comes to mind is the hour-glass-at the top we sift through the sands to allow a few
through to create the principles which then expand to cover the expanding universe of more cases
and more sands to which the principles can be applied. The principles stated in the MacCrate report
match this model. The Statement of Principles of Skills and Values [hereinafter "SSV"] are clearly
"induced" from the experience of lawyers and law teachers on the committee, working on cases and
teaching students, but then are now meant to be applied as general prirciples to the "facts" of on-
going legal education.
5. This statement may be a little exaggerated. In fact many of the ALI's Restatements have
accomplished the kind of rationalized, formalized statements of law, derived from the common law,
that would make any "scientist" of law proud.
6. For a thoughtful discussion of how the client is constructed as a gerneralized abstraction in legal
education see Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev.
1731 (1993).
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of the skills, attributes and competencies that lawyers will need in the
century to come.
I am thus, in the awkward position of being a skills teacher who will
criticize the teaching of skills as suggested in the MacCrate Report-am
I a Brutus about to stab Caesar? I hope that instead you will think I have
contributed to a broader conception of what a lawyer should be-a
professional with a wide range of particular skills but also a human being
who exercises judgment, cares for her fellow human beings, both clients
and the larger society and who has a vision of what professional work
should be that goes beyond litigation.
I hope to accomplish two small projects here-one is to critique the
MacCrate Report on its own terms and, as situated in the larger debate
about the goals of legal education, to expose, once again,7 the false
dualism of so-called intellectual rigor in legal ideas and "science" and the
presumed "weakness" of skills training by demonstrating that both
theory and skills are "legal science" and rigorous, and both are' also
incomplete and partial statements of what a lawyer needs to know.
Second, I hope to demonstrate that any conception of legal education and
law that focuses on a particular kind of rigor or "scientistic" notion of
lawyering is missing what is most important--call it the "art" of
lawyering,8 the "prudence" ofjudgmen 9 or simply the necessity of being
a caring human being who uses professional work to make the world a
better, not worse, place when she leaves it than when she found it.'0 For
me, the MacCrate Report pays insufficient attention to the human aspects
of lawyering-variously called empathic, affective, feeling," altruistic, 2
7. Unfortunately, much ink has already been spilt on this topic, see, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Theory
and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577 (1987);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 555 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1983) recognizing that at least
one of the lawyer's functions consists of both art and science.
9. See various formulations in Kronman, supra note 3; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 (1988).
10. In an informal poll I conducted of my colleagues of why they went into law teaching and what
they hoped to accomplish as law teachers, about half expressed goals that had to do with social
justice or uses of the lawyer's work in more than instrumental ways. See also Association of
American Law Schools Plenary Session, The Legal Educator: Who We Are and What Are We
Doing? (Jan. 1994).
11. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 4; Id. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: A
Theory of Emotions: The Gifford Lectures (1993); Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of
Value, 5 Yale J. Criticism 201 (1991); Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of
Human Feeling (1983).
12. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 385 (1992).
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and service 3 aspects of lawyering, whether the representation is of an
individual, an entity, or a "cause" 4 or issue. In short, from the various
points of critique that I apply to the MacCrate 'Report-intellectual,
sociological, feminist, mediative or problem-solving, normative, and
political-I hope to offer a more (re)constructive view of what it would
mean to be a lawyer and to teach a lawyer how to be and do, as well as to
think "like a lawyer."
The education of lawyers should deal with the cognitive, behavioral
and experiential, affective, and normative aspects of being and learning
as a professional. While traditional legal education has emphasized the
first of these over all others, some forms of skills training emphasize the
second over all others. I aim for a statement about legal education that
recognizes all of these constituent elements of being a lawyer and a
human being and acknowledges that they are intertwined and related to
each other, not necessarily in any particular linear or hierarchical order.
II. ONCE AGAIN WITH FEELING: LAW AS SCIENCE-LAW AS
ART
Both the MacCrate Report and Tony Kronman's, The Lost Lawyer,
take off from the same point: a concern and fear that the work of law
schools (both its teaching and its scholarship) has grown increasingly
remote and alienated from the work of the profession.15 In Professor
Kromnan's formulation there has been a dramatic sea-change in legal
education in the last twenty years. Thirty years ago, law professors were
at one with themselves in that their teaching, informed by the case
method's analogical and incremental reasoning, was of a piece with their
scholarship, "local solutions" to problems of doctrine, and the need for
mid-course corrections to rationalize and make better particular areas of
the law. Today, law teachers suffer from "schizophrenia" in the
disjunction between their teaching duties, 6 which still draw on case
methods, variously "diluted" by increasing use of lectures and other
13. Jill Chaifez, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling A Pro Bono Ethic in Law
School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1695 (1993); Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 755
(1991).
14. See "cause lawyering" project, Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold (1994).
15. Kromnan, supra note 3, at 168. See also Alex M. Johnson, Think Like A Lawyer, Work Like a
Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231 (1991)
and Edwards, supra note 2.
16. It is important to note here how many scholars of the legal profession have noted this
"disjunction", both in the past, see Hoeflich, supra note 2, and in the present, see Edwards, supra
note 2 and Stevens, supra note 2.
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more didactic methods, 7 and scholarly requirements to engage in the
"big think"' 8 of developing "background philosophical theories" to
explain not only doctrinal developments in the law, but larger political
and institutional developments as well. For Kronman, specific
developments in legal scholarship, such as the ascendancy of modem
legal scientism in the "totalizing" theories of law and economics and
critical legal studies, with their "hostility" to case-method "gradualism"
have led to a world in which legal scholars have nothing to say to
practicing lawyers. 9 The Task Force on Narrowing the Gap shares this
observation, along with other scholars and practitioners like Judge Harry
Edwards and Robert Stevens, and seeks to redefine what a legal
education should consist of to better prepare students to enter their own
profession-not the one of their teachers."
For me the issue of what is appropriate education for a lawyer is
intimately connected to what ends and means the lawyer employs for
what she will be doing. Unlike many of the more jurisprudential
scholars who write about what law is, I believe that legal, indeed all
professional, knowledge changes2' with the demands of changing
institutions and individual needs, and thus, although some forms of the
debate about theory/doctrine versus skills have been with us since the
beginning of legal time, I think that what is meant by these terms and
their relation to each other has changed over time as well. Unlike
conservative critics who fail to see how the diversity of the legal
education profession actually changes legal knowledge, 2 I believe that
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1647 (1993), for at
least one view, largely shared, that the Socratic method has been replaced by lecture (though few
would share Posner's suggested reason for its "decline").
18. This is the UCLA formulation of what is required of the modem legal scholar. Each
anthropologist of her own institution can reconstruct the particular vocabulary that each local
scholarly community has used to denominate what is required for tenure.
19. Kronman, supra note 3, at 264-70.
20. This tension between law professors who teach people to do not what they do, but something
else, is also long noted in the literature, see, e.g., Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man
Divided Against Himself 54 Va. L. Rev. 637 (1968); Kay, AALS Newsletter, From the President
(1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can A Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. Legal
Educ. 3 (1991); John Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship, or If the Professor Must Publish,
Must the Profession Perish? 39 J. Legal Educ. 343 (1989).
21. For my views on how feminism, for example, has changed what we consider to be "legal
knowledge," see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Pac. L.J. 1493
(1992).
22. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 17; Richard A. Epstein, Legal Education and the Politics of
Exclusion, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1607 (1993); Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 1885 (1993).
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not only do conditions change how we come to know things
(technology's influence on legal knowledge for example"), but who
produces the knowledge affects what we know as well.24
To briefly review the now familiar history of the tension between
theory and practice in legal education: The early history of legal
education in the United States was characterized by the apprenticeship
system, where some lawyers read law in the colonies and others studied
and worked in England. Yet even in the relatively early years, there was
some effort to treat law as a subject worthy of university study. George
Wythe, with whom Thomas Jefferson read law, was appointed by
Jefferson to a lectureship at the College of William & Mary in one effort
to systematize law teaching and study and to remove it, at least
somewhat, from practice. The teaching method was principally lecture,
and the idea was to teach general principles of law and some political
philosophy, removed from the distractions of everyday practice. The
move from apprenticeship to the university was actually more
complicatedthan many writers have told us. Some academic lawyers,
like Langdell, were motivated to establish law as a legal science,
influenced as they were, in part, by the European social sciences as well
as by "natural" science. Some members of the profession sought to
make law study more "rigorous" so as to limit the number of
practitioners, while others hoped that formal educational requirements
might actually make the profession slightly more democratic.2"
In the contest over who would get to control legal education-the
practitioners or the "academic lawyers" (they are not called legal
scholars until much later)-a rich literature was produced in arguing for
the benefits of particularity in learning (through the actual cases of
practice) versus the generality of principles learned either by the case
method, as later developed by Langdell, or by lectures on particular
substantive topics. The way the debate has been framed by many writers
conflates and confuses a number of interesting tensions and ironies, all of
which have been carried through to the present day.
23. See Gary Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Cognitive Differences Between Novice and Erpert
Attorneys (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
24. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Law, 42 U. Miami L. Rev.
29 (1987); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1981 (1993); cf. Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989) (critiquing the
claimed "essentialism" in knowledge produced from group membership).
25. For general sources on this history in more detailed form, see Stevens, supra note 2; Hoeflich,
supra note 2; Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (2d ed. 1985); Jerold Auerbach,
Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (1976).
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First, there is the concern about where the education ought to take
place-law office or university? This is recapitulated in the
"compromise" solution offered by the MacCrate Report. The report
takes the view that legal education is a continuing process26 which begins
with "foundational learning" in the law school, which emphasizes some
substantive law, legal writing, legal reasoning, some skills training, and
the ability to critically reflect on practice with a methodology designed to
carry the lawyer through a self-critical learning process throughout her
professional life.27 Following law school, education continues through
"bridge the gap" programs, continuing education programs, and for those
who are lucky enough to work there, sophisticated in-house training,
done by the major law firms. The locale of training raises questions
about whether what is learned differs depending on where it is
learned--can legal reasoning be divorced from judgment? What kind of
legal analysis is learned where facts are fixed and not dynamic as in the
real world? For those who teach in clinics, this debate is a false one,
because judgment, reasoning, fact-finding and ethics are all taught in the
university, and in a practice setting-a form of situated practice learning
quite common to most other professions.28
By successfully completing the project to move most, if not all, of
legal education, to the university, reformers moved to the what and how
of legal study. Here Langdell's substantive message and the robustness
of his method are often confused. Initially, Langdell's argument for the
study of cases was based in a belief that law could be made a science
with principles induced from the "data" of cases. Thus, "thinking like a
lawyer" was seen as the analogy to the scientific method, and the hope
was that law (in each of its subjects) would be reducible to a finite
number of foundational principles. The process of inducing these
principles would, as a by-product, teach young men (and I do mean
men29) a method of thinking that coincided with the judicial tasks of
interpreting the law in a common law system and the task of the lawyer
in sifting the relevant from the irrelevant in preparing and arguing a case.
26. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 3-8.
27. See, e.g., Anthony Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J.
Legal Educ. 612 (1984).
28. See Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (1983),
and Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Towards a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the
Professions (1957). See also Symposium, Theoretics or Practice: The Integration of Progressive
Thought andAction, 43 Hastings L.J. 717 (1992).
29. For a brief introduction to the notion that women might reason differently than men and learn
differently, see Mary Field Belenky et al., Women's Ways of Knowing (1986); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990).
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Note that this mixed inductive-deductive process could just as easily
have been conducted from the real cases of the law office-it is just that
those cases might not present the full range of issues as selected by a
teacher who was free to survey the whole field.
Langdell's scientific project proved less successful than his
methodological one. Though we continue to ask students to parse cases
and sift the relevant from the irrelevant in the hope!3 they will learn the
sharpness of mind" that comes with "thinking like a lawyer," most of us
no longer think that the rules or principles that are so derived have the
same staying power as scientific laws.3 Instead, as law teachers, we
often seek divergent ends-some pointing to the political underpinnings
of the rules,32 others to the efficiencies of the rules,33 others to the
competing arguments that can be made "on either side" of the rule,
anticipating its change in other factual circumstances. What unites the
law teachers who use this method is no longer a belief in the end-
product, a series of "scientifically derived" principles, but a belief that
the process of "Socratic dialogue" (even if now somewhat distorted)34
teaches a way of thinking that is peculiarly what lawyers do. That the
method has worked so well with such a large student-teacher ratio and
has thus made legal education cheap and profitable from the university
perspective says more for its economic success than its intellectual
worth.
30. Or, in its more cynical formulation: "law makes a man's mind sharer by narrowing it."
31. There is an interesting competing strand in the Langdellian literiture, which I cannot fully
pursue here, which contrasts the physical science paradigm (law as biology, botany or geometry, see,
e.g., Kronman supra note 4 at 181-85 (Langdell's "pointilliste" plan); I-oeflich, supra note 3, with
the social science paradigm. As a measure of human artifacts, rather than "natural" ones, law, in my
view, could still be assimilable to the more tentative and changeable prcpositions of social science,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of Engaged Social Science
in Legal Studies, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (1990). See also Thomas C. Crey, Langdell's Orthodoxy,
45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1983). For an argument that natural or physical science is as subject to human
"control" in interpretation and selection of material, see Sandra Harding, Whose Knowledge? Whose
Science?: Thinkingfrom Women's Lives (1992); The Science Question in Feminism (1986).
32. This is done both from a critical perspective, see Mark Kelman, Guide to Critical Legal
Studies (1987) or a more conventional and mid-range policy or pluralistki conception of the old Hart
& Sacks "process" school, see Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (1958).
33. See, e.g., William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study, 36 J. L. & Econ. (1993).
34. I say distorted because what passes for Socratic dialogue in the law school classroom is
neither Socratic (too many students) nor dialogue (in its conventional fbrm the teacher dominates
and already knows the answer to questions he poses) and many classes don't engage in it anymore at
all.
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Any history or critique of legal education must thus confront both
legacies of the Langdell heritage-the substantive project of legal
science and the methodological one of "thinking like a lawyer" from the
case (appellate) method as taught in the university classroom. Ironically
for me, the MacCrate Report seems to have brought the two together
again-in its efforts to specify a "Statement of Fundamental Lawyering
Skills and Professional Values," 35 it attempts to classify both skills and
values in a taxonomy as detailed as any statement of tort or contract law
principles that Langdell would hope to deliver.
Thus, if Tony Kronman can claim that both law and economics and
critical legal studies are derived from the same scientific strand of legal
realism, I could add that the particular conception of skills training
described in the MacCrate Report could similarly be accused of an effort
to develop foundational principles and rigid formulations. The push to
require law schools to teach particular skills is an ironic twist on the
question of where law should be learned. In broadening the subject of
"legal science" to include skills, the report now encourages the teaching
of practice, as well as theory and doctrine, in the law school. This effort
to change the what and where of legal education is a development I
mostly applaud-there is hope that legal science and legal realism can be
united in a productive way in this effort. But what is problematic to me
is how that effort is defined.
In legal realism's critique of the Langdellian version of legal science,
several competing themes emerge36 and are well canvassed by others,"
most recently Professor Kronman.3 Here my focus is on that aspect of
35. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-221.
36. Some of these themes include different conceptions of both law and lawyering as defined in
reaction to the Langdellian ideal type. Some examples include law as a social and policy science
that needs empirical study to develop corrections; the lawyer as social engineer or "policy wonk" as
opposed to single client representative, the lawyer and judge as molded by extra-legal values that
must be studied and understood. Legal realists differed among themselves in terms of how much
could be done about the extra-legal influences on legal decision-making (the famous "what the judge
had for breakfast" more arbitrary description of Jerome Frank's brand of realism) and whether either
law or "values" could be cabined within some greater political purposes. Kronman, for example,
suggests that Lasswell and MacDougal in essence thought they could create a "science" out of
values that had greater "meta" power over law but also could be studied and learned, see Harold D.
Lasswell & Myres S. MacDougal, Legal Science and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 Yale LJ. 203 (1943); Kronnan, supra note 3, at 201-09.
37. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986); John Henry Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science from the Yale Perspective, 28 Buff. L. Rev.
459 (1979); Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 Va. L.
Rev. 689 (1968); William L. Twining, KarlLlewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973).
38. Kronman, supra note 3, at 168-225.
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legal realism which Karl Llewellyn called craft or "horse-sense '39 or the
art of lawyering. Like Jerome Frank,40 Llewellyn thought it important
that law be studied as a social science, with an emphasis on how the
variations in the factual or empirical world might create variations in the
applicability of doctrine. Like Frank, he recognized, as well, that a
lawyer's and judge's values would affect the interpretation and practice
of law and that it was necessary to teach students to develop their skills
and craft in putting law, facts, and values together. (Recall my earlier
statement that law must be learned and practiced on the cognitive,
affective, behavioral, and normative levels simultaneously). Unlike
Frank, who seemed only to want to make us all aware and conscious of
these influences (Kronman calls this Frank's "therapeutic" approach to
lawmaking), Llewellyn reveled in the joy of learning to express the craft
from both an artistic sense and from a humanistic se:ase.4 This approach,
evoking intuition, verstehen in the Weberian sense,42 empathy, and a
"balanced shrewdness" that comes from living a life in the law, has been
echoed in a variety of modem approaches to lawyering and judging that
focus more on the human than the scientific side of lawyering. The
Brandeis "Doing Justice" program,4 3 which draws ort the use of literature
to explore deeper human meanings and relationships for judges outside
of the limitations of their cases is one such example. Recent scholarship
which seeks to explore the emotional, empathic, and human side of law
and lawyering is another." Thus, in both the Holmesian sense of the
39. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960); Kronman supra
note 3, at 209-25.
40. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1970); Why Not a Clinical Latyer
School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933).
41. See Spiegel, supra note 7, at 588; Kronman supra note 3 at 213-225. Kronman writes
approvingly of Llewellyn as one who had a heightened sense of prudenlial wisdom, who saw in the
habits of mind that experience and expertise create a "horse-sense" that recognizes the judge and
lawyer as human, as having to develop an empathic and intuitive understanding of the situations
people get into that require legal manipulation. See Karl N. Llewelyn, The Study of Law as a
LiberalArt, in Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1962).
42. Max Weber, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building (S.N. Eisenstadt ed. 1968);
Roslyn W. Bologh, Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine Thinking-A Feminist Inquiry
(1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber (1983); David Trubek, Reconstructing Max Weber's
Theory of Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 919 (1985) (book review).
43. Saul Touster, Doing Justice, Brandeis University. This program engages judges in discussing
the factors that affect their decisionmaking, through discussions of literature, not real cases, to
engage their reactions to human dilemmas at a deeper level.
44. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987);
Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling and the Rule of Law; New Words, Old Wounds, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1989); Carrie
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"logic of the law is experience"" and Llewellyn's craft sense, law and
lawyering are part of an artistic, intuitive sensibility that reminds us that
we are humans, not chemical elements or plant sub-species that can be
fixed in taxonomic categories. It is in this dimension of the "art" of
lawyering-as well as to the values of what lawyering should be done
for- that I think the work of the MacCrate Report misses its mark.
III. CONCEPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE LAWYER:
MAcCRATE'S LITIGATOR AND KRONMAN'S
"PRUDENTIAL LAWYER-STATESMAN"
What is the conception of lawyering and of the use of the law that the
MacCrate Report describes? In my view, the picture of lawyering
created by the MacCrate Report enacts a kind of "technocratic problem-
solver" that is vaguely rooted in one branch of the legal realist school of
lawyering and most firmly rooted in a conventional litigation conception
of lawyering-lawyering is, if you will, "scientized" (sanitized?) here.
Although the "Statements" (of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and
Professional Values) look like they allude to lawyering "arts" and
"ethics," I read these statements as "supplementary add-ons"'46 that are
not really incorporated into the document in any meaningful way.47 After
Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories
of Law, 2 UCLA W.L.J. 287 (1992); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11.
45. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 5 (1881).
46. In structure, the statements remind me of the critique by critical legal scholars that the rules
always contain the possibility of supplementation (like unconscionability in contract doctrine) to
offer the possibility of blunting harsh rules or to permit the expression of discretionary standards
within an otherwise harsh and rigid sense of principles, while the enforcers and interpreters of the
rules have the choice of what side of the line of "indeterminacy" to follow, see, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Duncan
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); James Boyle,
The Polities of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685
(1985); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1985); Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1 (1984); Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Law, 94 Yale L.L 997 (1985).
47. Candor forces me to disclose here that I attempted some input into these statements and
suspect the Task Force thought it was responding. Through my dean, Susan Westerberg Prager, who
was a member of the Task Force; several of us with a broader view of lawyering (expressing the
values of the alternative dispute resolution movement on one hand, and transactional lawyering on
another) submitted comments and suggestions to the drafters. The result, discussed more fully
above, was an "add-on" such as found in Skill # 8, Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures. No one with any real knowledge of the skills implicated in dispute resolution choices
and practice would recognize as defining or complete any of the skills and values statements found
in the report. Indeed, in its final statement in the accompanying commentary, the report indicates
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I complete my critical project, I hope to suggest what a more developed
and modem view of the lawyer would look like.
In an honest effort to demonstrate how broadily it conceived its
mission, the Task Force on Narrowing the Gap Between the Profession
and the Law School canvassed the increasing diversification of the bar
on at least two dimensions-the changing format of practice (size and
specialization) and the changing faces of the practitioners (along race,
gender and class lines), although it does little to relate these
developments to each other.48 Indeed, while acknowledging the diversity
of the profession, the "reasons for a statement" preamble to the statement
itself reflects a continuing desire on the part of the ABA (and to a lesser
extent, legal educators' desire) to frame a statement with a view toward
the "traditional vision of a unitary profession,"49 in the hope of creating
and stating, "the fundamental'values of the profession."5
Though the report recognizes that some lawyers work in teams, rather
than alone, the normative form of representation clearly still
contemplates a lawyer representing a single client (even if an entity
client) and assumes a representational-litigation posture in virtually all of
its statements.5 ' The lawyer is called "a problem-solver" 2 who develops
a strategy or plan on behalf of the client (to achieve the client's goals) in
which she gathers facts, marshals arguments, does legal research,
counsels a client about the decision to be made (emphasis added-since
that a well-trained "generalist need not be familiar with the intricacie; of the various forms of
'primary' and 'hybrid' alternative dispute resolution mechanisms." How then is a dispute resolving
lawyer supposed to advise a client? (This is less than the Colorado bar requires of its lawyers in its
new ethical requirements that lawyers advise their clients about what me:hods of dispute resolution
might be appropriate for their cases. Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.1 Advisor
(1993).)
48. See some other efforts to do this, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life
in Law. Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 621 (1994); Carroll Seron, When Lawyers Go to Market: The Re-structuring of Private
Practice (1994 mms.); Lawyer's Ideals/Lawyer's Practices: Transformations in the American Legal
Profession (Robert Nelson, David Trubek & Rayman Solomon, eds. 1992); Richard Abel, American
Lawyers (1989).
49. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 124.
50. Id.
51. It is important to acknowledge that the Report does reflect the possibility that lawyers might
work for governmental agencies or work in-house in a corporate setting or work in a variety of
public interest settings, but there is virtually no discussion of the ypical lawyering tasks of
facilitating transactions, planning an administrative or governmental policy strategy, acting as a third
party neutral or drafting legislation.
52. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 141-51.
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when does a client make a single decision?), negotiates "with the other
side" (emphasis added)53 and when that fails, tries and appeals a case
unless it "in appropriate circumstances" requires administrative or
alternative dispute resolution treatment instead,54 while at the same time
managing legal work both efficiently and ethically." This description of
the lawyer, taken from the specified skills, is an effort to develop a
protean and generalized statement of what lawyers do so that a unitary
profession can be described for purposes of describing the education that
could serve that "unitary" profession well. 6 In one sense, then, the
report continues a long ABA project of looking to ways to include all
lawyers in its descriptions of lawyering so that the ABA can both
represent and regulate "the profession."
This description of the lawyer is not unique to the Task Force's
conception. Professor Kronman also seeks to establish some core ideas
that characterize the lawyer as having particular skills or qualities that
both distinguish the lawyer from other professionals and create enough
commonality for lawyers out of the one thing they hold in
common-their legal education-to instill a sense of common virtue and
pride in the lawyer's work. Kronman's conception of the lawyer is
similar to that envisioned in the MacCrate Report: the law trained
professional is primarily a judge, a counselor or an advocate57-- all
traditional, litigation-oriented58 functions. What Kronman does add to
53. Do all legal matters have "another side"? What about an uncontested probate of a will, a
simple adoption, drafting a power of attorney or living will? Note the language throughout the SSV
assumes a particular posture toward the client's "problems" and the rest of the world.
54. Both the order and the language used in Skill # 8 convey a strong notion of litigation at the
core and other forms of dispute resolution at the periphery. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute
Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69 Judicature 300 (1986).
55. Note that the tone of the ethical skill # 10, Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas,
treats the lawyer's ethical issues as just another problem to be "solved" or resolved-as if all law
practice dilemmas-both client problems and lawyer problems are subject to a "solution."
Specifically, the statement suggests that the lawyer "identify a solution that satisfies the applicable
ethical rules and principles while at the same time, accommodating any competing interests of a
client." MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 206.
56. This effort to perpetuate a notion of the unitary profession by the organized bar is reminiscent
of the reaction to the Reed Report on legal education and its failed attempt to recognize diversity in
legal education for different segments of the bar. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 112-23.
57. Kronman, supra note 3, at 116-54.
58. Note here that I call this conception only litigation-oriented, not litigation-based. Kronman
recognizes the lawyer as counselor and most significantly, for my purposes, sees the lawyer-
statesman as a facilitator of the political fraternity and as a builder of a "transactional community."
Id. at 152-54. However, he still orients the lawyer's work toward the constitutive elements of
lawyering as argument, rhetoric, persuasion, the ability to predict what judges (and less
convincingly, juries) would do if the case were litigated. The lawyer develops his knowledge from
Washington Law Review Vol. 69:593, 1994
the picture, however, is a nuanced and sophisticated attempt to describe
the affective elements of lawyering-practical wisdom and judgment,
which consist as much of intuition, feeling, and sympathy (the art of
lawyering) as reason and the science of lawyering. h that, Kronman's
description of the lawyer recognizes important aspects of lawyering
which are barely mentioned in the MacCrate Report, and if they are
mentioned at all, are not really integrated in the statement of principles.5 9
Thus, Kronman's description of a practical or prudential wisdom
incorporates the kind of affective knowledge that is scarcely recognized
in the MacCrate Report.
Interestingly, and consistent with my own views, Kronman believes
that these affective aspects of lawyering can be taught and learned' (a
point I return to below). Thus, unlike other defenders of the legal
education faith, he does not exclude the development of sympathy or an
ability to look at client's decisions from the perspective of both client
and lawyer as things which cannot be taught. This should be contrasted
to the overly mechanistic and "rationalized" description of counseling
appellate cases and such knowledge is case dependent. Aside from the fact that practicing lawyers
are much more likely today to consult form documents on computers than run to cases in deciding
what to do for clients, Kronman's vision still is nostalgically based on the potentiality of litigation
coloring all that the lawyer does-a notion I critique in the text above. This focus on litigation as the
basic core of what lawyers do has led, I believe, to a "romanticism" about litigation which I have
criticized in other contexts, principally when opponents of alternative dispute resolution posit a
"base-line" comparison to litigation which is often inaccurate. These critics of ADR are, in my
view, "litigation romanticists." See e.g. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J 1073 (1984);
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? ADR 's Ideological Hostilio , to Adjudication, Ohio St.
J. on Disp. Resol. (1994).
59. Initially I was inclined to label this a feminist critique of the MacCrate report for reasons I
have long been on record about-that women would be more likely to desire, appreciate, and
perform the affective aspects of lawyering. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I Berkeley W.L.J. 31 (1985); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession in Lawyers and Society: Comparative Theories
(Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis, eds. 1989). I am slightly less inclined to do that now, both
because of a more complex reading of women's behaviors as lawyers, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism and Legal Ethics, Va. J. of L. and Soc. Pol'y
(forthcoming); Mona Harrington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules (1994) and because of recent
efforts, both theoretical (see Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries (1993)) and descriptive, to detach
gender from affective behavior and concerns of male lawyers. See Kronrran, supra note 3; Stephen
Ellmann, The Ethic of Care As An Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665 (1993). I still believe that
male descriptions of a concern about human caring in lawyering are different (I seem to be an
irrepressible difference theorist)--see the moral "distance" described by Ellmann at 2679-2698 and
Kronman's notion of sympathy and detachment, Kronman, supra note 3, at 128-146.
60. Kromnan, supra note 3, at 66-74, 98.
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provided in Skill #6, Counseling, in the MacCrate Report.6 In particular,
note the "negative" way in which the lawyer's "objective" distance is
discussed in the MacCrate Report-that the lawyer should "strike a
proper balance" between "the need to maintain dispassion and objectivity
despite the role of partisan advocate for the client" and the "lawyer's
need to guard against being so dispassionate and objective as to be
unable to view issues and options from the client's perspective."'62 Could
this have been stated more positively, perhaps in the framework
suggested by Kronman, as having both sympathy for and detachment
from the client, at the same time?63
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE MACCRATE CONCEPTION: THE
CONTESTABILITY OF LAWYERTNG SKILLS, THEORIES,
AND THE NEED FOR A BROADER RANGE OF SKILLS
Indeed, for me, the overarching difficulty with the MacCrate Report
and its "scientistic" deductive description of law and lawyering is its
61. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 176-84. I recognize that much of what appears in the
MacCrate report on counseling is indeed derived from the work of my own colleagues, David A.
Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991), whose work was
pathbreaking in its attempts to construct a model of client-centered counseling. nevertheless, I think
the model pays insufficient attention to the emotive aspects both of the client's intra-psychic
processes in decision making and to the complex relationship between lawyer and client, which we
now know may vary a great deal depending on the social distance between client and lawyer and
other factors which vary in the multitudinous ways in which lawyers and clients meet. See Shalleck,
supra note 6; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients. 34 UCLA L. Rev. 717 (1987); Robert D.
Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 697 (1992); Nelson, Partners with
Power: Social Transformation of the Large Firm (1988). In its most recent form, the Binder text at
least attempts to deal with variations in what the counseling decision is about-transactional
decisions, decisions that do not involve "other sides" (like drafting a will). The MacCrate Report
suggests other kinds of decisions, wills, and bankruptcy filing, but seems to assume single
decisionmakers-an individual client. Virtually none of the counseling literature does a good job of
discussing decisions when made by groups (not just class members in litigation, but entity,
organizational, corporate and other group settings where the lawyer may have to "facilitate"
decisionmaking among many decisionmakers). For one good attempt to wrestle with some of these
problems, see Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103
(1992); see also Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation and Fairness, 54 Ohio St. L.J.
1(1993).
62. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 177-78.
63. While I am somewhat critical of the professional "detachment" model, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden
Rule of Candor, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (1990), at least Kronman is able to hold two seemingly
disparate concepts at the same time. That to me is the essence of professional work-refusing to live
at the poles of one extreme but being able to act from the complex location of competing issues and
concerns that is our existential condition from "knowing so much."
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failure to take account of the complexity of differing theories about both
law and lawyering. I could easily subscribe to a statement that students
and lawyers should be taught counseling and negotiation, for example.
Unlike others who cringe at any requirement that skills be taught in the
law schools at all,' I support the notion that behavior and skills should
be taught (the art as well as science of lawyering), but I cringe at the
adoption of particular conceptions of those skills in a number of areas
where the conceptualization of those skills is every bit as controversial as
whether economics has something to say about the right to free speech.6'
Different theories or approachs to skills are the sign of a developing and
exciting new discipline about lawyering and should be presented to
students and lawyers with all of the richness and controversy as is
exhibited in the more traditional curriculum of the "science" of doctrine
and theory.
Let me briefly illustrate this perspective on the theory of skills, as both
science and art, with three examples, client counseling, negotiation, and
dispute resolution.
A. Client Counseling and Communication
In a laudable effort to create a model or statement of principles and
objectives in client counseling (and also to respond to a concern that, at
least in some areas,66 lawyers tend to dominate their clients, a client-
centered model of counseling was born.67 The impulse behind this
model, that the client must live the life that comes after the decision (and
not the lawyer) and thus should make the decision is both noble and
ethical (that is, it was technically the rule in the Model Code of
64. See, e.g., Paul Brest, When Should A Lawyer Learn the Way to the Courthouse, Stanford
Lawyer (Fall 1993) 2; John Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loave, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. Leg. Ed. 157 (1993).
65. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
66. Particularly those involving poor clients and elite lawyers. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, To
Learn and Teach: Lessons From Diefrontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 699;
Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.. 1049 (1970); Lucie White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 7 (1990); Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. Va. L. Rev. 305 (1988); Gerald P. Lopez,
Rebellious Lawyering (1992).
67. See, e.g., David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling, 1977;
Thomas Shaffer, Legal Interviewing and Counseling in a Nutshell (1976).
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Professional Responsibility"). Recent rigorous inquiries into the
complexities of lawyer-client decisionmaking, by lawyers, ethicists, and
sociologists to name a few,69 have suggested that the power and socio-
economic relationships between clients and lawyers may suggest
variations on who should be the primary decision maker in particular
matters or settings. More recently, several commentators have suggested
that it is more important that there be a "moral dialogue" 0 about the
factors involved in a decision than that a particular rule should specify
who does the deciding-a "principle" which grants both the client and
the lawyer their human and professional dignity and craft interests."
Thus, for my taste, the effort to state, even "aspirationally" the
particulars of the skill of counseling rigidifies a far more complex and
textured possibility of teaching and learning what the factors should be in
client-lawyer decisionmaking responsibilities, variations which include
who the client(s) are, who the lawyer(s) are and what their vision of
lawyering is,72 as well as the variations of types of decisions to be
made-policy, litigative, transactional, legislative, governmental, private
interest, or familial.
As a teacher of counseling, I am much more interested in teaching
some basic foundational skills (like the "art" of question framing (see
below)) and the multiplicity of theories that now inform how these skills
68. See, e.g., Ethical Considerations 7-7 and 7-8. Clients should be apprised of all considerations
in making decisions, but particularly when non-legal matters are involved clients should decide what
to do. See Rule 1.2, Model Rules of Professional Conduct for modem expression of the means-
objectives division of labor between lawyer and client.
69. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision Making: Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. Pa. L.J. 41 (1979); Nelson, supra note 64; Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D.
Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling and Negotiation: Skills for Effective Representation (1990);
Ellmann, supra note 61; Robert D. Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501 (1990).
70. For writers who have written eloquently on this moral dialogue see Warren Lehman, In
Pursuit of A Client's Interest, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1078 (1979); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study (1988); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083
(1988).
71. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dvorkin et al., Becoming A Lawyer (1980) and Howard Lesnick, Being A
Lawyer: Individual Choice and Responsibility in the Practice of Law 66-117 (1990).
72. I have not even begun to attempt a description here of a variety of different expressions of
what the lawyer's vision of herself is-from the new "civic republicanism", see, e.g., William H.
Simon & Robert V. Gordon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers'
Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Robert Nelson et al. eds., 1992);
Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1987); to political and social
activist, see White, Lopez, supra note 66; to entrepreneur, see Seron, supra note 48; to Marvin
Mendes & Alan Acock, Hero, Trickster, Helper: A Report on Lawyer Image, 1982 AmB. F. Res. J.
177 (1982); to power-brokers, Edward 0. Laumann et al., Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in
Washington, 22 Law & Soc. Rev. 237 (1988).
Washington Law Review
should be exercised than to assume an all-purpose model that works in
some abstracted or assumed-to-be-true conception of where lawyering
always takes place.
The assumptions of an overly abstracted, and standardized conception
of counseling are evident in Skill #5, Communication, the constituent
skill of any lawyering task, which specifies an instrumental, not
affective, approach to lawyer-client communications. Lawyers are to
gather facts, determine what are relevant arguments, tailor words to the
audience and "attend to emotional and interpersonal factors that might be
affecting the communication"" without one expression of "caring" for
the client's concerns, putting the client at ease, learning how to actively
listen so as to create a relationship, not just to process information. In
short, the communication suggested here is to benefit the lawyer
instrumentally in performing tasks for the client--it is not written to
facilitate a true relationship between lawyer and client.
B. Negotiation
The MacCrate Report's effort to specify skills gets into deeper trouble
(with me) when it attempts to deal with the scientifically and artistically
complex task of negotiation. In its attempts to specify some variations in
context (dispute-resolution negotiation or transactional negotiation) it
conflates some highly disputed theories about when. particular models of
negotiation might be appropriate. 4 In the end, the description of
negotiation skills adopted by the MacCrate Report returns to a reified
approach to distributional negotiation 75 by suggesting that the negotiator
should look for "settling points", "bottom lines," "ranks" of outcomes
and "reciprocal concessions."7" The standards do what much negotiation
literature does-they conflate goals and purposes with styles. Not all
disputes can be divided into zero-sum versus non-.zero sum disputes a
priori. Indeed, it is the very skill of the negotiator that can "create
73. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 174.
74. See, e.g., Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes (2d ed. 1992); James J. White, The Pros and Cons
of Getting to Yes, 34 J. Leg. Ed. 115 (1984); Gerald P. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement
(1983); David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for
Cooperation and Cooperative Gain (1986).
75. It is particularly troubling for me to critique this section, since much of it is based on my own
work, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Nregotiation: The Structure of
Legal Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984), and some of it was drafted in response to
comments I made to drafts of the report.
76. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 185-90.
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value"" and transform a problem from a distributional problem to an
integrative one. This is distinct (analysis of the problem) from the
behaviors used by negotiators to achieve their objectives (choice of
"styles" in cooperative, competitive, or collaborative behaviors).
Let me illustrate both the contestability of negotiation frameworks,
and the power of "models" from my own teaching. Recently, I had
students conduct a simulated role-play designed to test their ability and
willingness to lie and dissemble in order to reach agreement. 8  The
Teacher's Manual for the problem suggests that the only way the
students can reach agreement is for one side not to mention a possible
eminent-domain condemnation of the property for sale and the other side
must not reveal who its actual principal is and what the intended use of
the property is. In over half of my students' role-plays the students
revealed the problematic facts and constructed remarkably creative
solutions to the problems-shared risk, shared uses, proposals to seek
historic preservation status to prevent condemnation and many others.
These students (possibly "brainwashed" by an unreconstructed problem-
solving instructor, teaching with her own "model") demonstrated the best
in creative lawyering-they "fought the hypo" and solved the legal and
economic problems encountered by the parties. All of this would have
been quite complex to arrange in "real life" with real clients, but the
skills of seeing how to take a negotiation "problem" and convert it into
an "opportunity" for development (both in terms of real property and in
creative thinking) demonstrated to me the significance of how one
teaches particular models or conceptions of lawyering. To focus on
"bottom lines" and "settling points" here not only might have "killed the
deal," and prevented a "Pareto-optimal" use of the property, but certainly
could have led to deals with deceptive conduct that might have been used
to overturn the contract later.
Thus, while the MacCrate Report drafters probably thought they were
paying attention to the models of distributional and integrative or
problem-solving negotiation, they in fact "enacted" a particular
substantive model that does not illuminate how lawyers should
analytically approach problems and how they might go about analyzing
whether a particular negotiated outcome is appropriate or not. The
MacCrate Report suggests that lawyers (and students) learn how to
77. See Lax & Sebenius, supra note 74; Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation
(1982).
78. The problem was the Colonial Confectioners, Inc. problem in Stephen Goldberg et al., Dispute
Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes 87 (1992) and Teacher's Manual at 22-26
(1992).
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conceptualize whether a problem can be dealt with "competitively" or
"cooperatively," but in doing so they have reduced all negotiation to
"style" or behavior and have not suggested how lawyers can learn to
"open up" legal problems, conceptually to "expand the res" or
reconfigure and disaggregate elements of the problem.79
Once again, even Kronman, who does not really focus on skills,
suggests a much more sophisticated analysis by suggesting that in every
negotiation the lawyer must consider not only his own client but the
"welfare and self-interest" of the other side, if only to motivate an
agreement. Kronman is here taking account of the now extensive game
theory and empirical literature" which suggests the cooperative aspects
of even the most competitive negotiation game"'.
Kronman goes on further to elaborate a more normative view of
negotiation-that the transactional negotiator can be creative and public-
spirited in enjoying and finding fulfillment in creating and encouraging
"transactional communities."" The same could be said of the dispute
resolving negotiator who creates value, solves a problem or improves
relations after a disrupted situation ripens into a "litigative" situation.
Thus, Kronman suggests the affective and artful side of negotiation, now
supported by the many scientific studies of negotiation, thereby
illustrating the connection of "science" and "art" and the simple-minded
foolishness of adopting a particular substantive model of litigative
negotiation as does the MacCrate Report.
Interestingly, in a recent study of how lawyers, valued their legal
education, researchers Bryant Garth and Joanne Martin83 found that
recently graduated practitioners now thought that legal negotiation was
not only important to their practices but could be taught and learned in
law school.84 The authors attribute this finding to the: growth of theory in
the field of negotiation (as distinguished from other skill areas). Thus, in
pointing out that success in the legal academy depends on the intellectual
value of the scholarship and "production of knowledge" function of
79. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 75, at 794-829.
80. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (19:34); Eric Rasmusen, Game
Theory (1992); William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (1992); see also R. Picker, Law &
Economics: IntellectualArbitrage, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 127 (1993).
81. See Kronman, supra note 3, at 151-54.
82. Id. at 153.
83. The study was a replication of the survey study of lawyers done by Frances Kahn Zemans and
Victor G. Rosenblum in the 1970s, The M1raking of a Public Profession (1981).
84. Bryant Garth & Joame Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. Legal
Educ. 469, 505 (1993).
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research, Garth and Martin, in essence, refute the charges of Judge
Edwards and others that there is a growing disjunction between research
in the academy and the needs of practitioners. Where academic research
has clarified and focused on issues that meet the needs of
practitioners-both in a pure form (game theory) and in an applied form
(distributional versus problem-solving models), it has been recognized as
contributing to the education of lawyers. Thus, it is both the rigorous
and contested conceptualization of skills (and the concomitant creation
of theory), rather than a rigidified and non-controversial statement of
skills, that has actually increased the interest of law students and the
effectiveness and usefulness to lawyers of "skills" education.
Negotiation is a particularly fertile ground to explore the science and
art forms of lawyering because it does involve both conceptualization of
the goals and res of the negotiation and, secondarily, the behavioral and
instrumental aspects of its performance. This is exactly the kind of
rigorous "craft" that Llewellyn might have contemplated could be
effectively taught in the law school.8 That the MacCrate Report enacts a
particular conception of negotiation and fails to appreciate the
complexity of the issues to be studied and learned is unfortunate.
C. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Litigation
From my own particular vantage point the expression of fundamental
skills involved in Skill #8, Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures, is most problematic. It is fairly obvious that the Alternative
Dispute Resolution section is an "add-on" and not integrated with the
lawyer's role as a dispute resolver. To begin such a section with
"knowledge of the fundamentals of litigation at the trial-court level,"
reveals that the default position of the drafters is to begin with litigation,
rather than to attempt to "solve the problem," as Skill #1 would seem to
85. Is it a coincidence that one of the first and most effective negotiation teachers and scholars,
James J White at Michigan, was also a commercial law scholar? White's co-authorship of one of
the first texts on negotiation, with Judge Harry T. Edwards, Problems, Readings, and Materials on
the Lanyer as Negotiator (1977), demonstrates the close relationship between skills and substance
(both theory and doctrine) in a wide variety of courses in the law-commercial law, labor law,
contracts, and property law to name a few. See also Cornelius Peck, Cases and Materials on
Negotiation (2d ed. 1980) (negotiation text developed by torts and labor law scholar). In its attempt
to "sell" skills teaching as a separate concern, the MacCrate report fails to address the important
connections between teaching doctrine and skills together. For several examples of trying to focus
on more than doctrine at once, see Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Lawyers and Dispute
Resolution (1989) (an effort to teach dispute resolution and lawyering skills pervasively in the first
year curriculum) and Deborah Rhode, Ethics By the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Leg. Ed. 31 (1992).
This would be a new illustration of the "seamless web of the law."
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require. Truly understanding the "fundamentals of proceedings in other
dispute resolution forums" would suggest considering those which could
be used before litigation even begins-negotiation, mediation,
conciliation, ombuds services, to name a few. Thus, the drafters reveal,
in this statement, their own biases and the biases of many skills training
programs-litigation and litigation of a particular type is the norm, and
"other" forms of dispute resolution are the exception. Yet we know that
in actual importance to their practice, lawyers will spend less time in
formal litigation than in a host of other skills. It may be more important
for lawyers to know how to facilitate meetings, bolh with committees
seeking to accomplish a task and with "opposing sides" in order to
effectuate client purposes, than to develop proficiency in the
"presentation of proofs."
Furthermore, the failure of this section of the report to relate ADR to
transactional work demonstrates just how uninformed the drafters were
with respect to how these processes operate. That ADR is called
"proceedings" and that lawyers are to learn about the "presentation of
proofs and arguments" in ADR proceedings demonstrates just how little
the drafters were able to educate themselves abott some very basic
processes such as mediation, with or without assistance of counsel.
These processes are not new and are indeed mandated in a wide variety
of court settings86 which would require even the most conventional of
litigators to know about how they function. That the commentary of the
section concludes that "a well trained generalist need not be familiar with
the intricacies of the various forms of primary and hybrid alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms,"87 suggests that the Report does not even
require enough knowledge of ADR to satisfactorily counsel a client who
could be ordered by a court to attend one of the hybrid processes.88 Given
the elaborate work done by a variety of ADR legal professionals to
develop standards for the conduct of ADR in a variety of settings,89 the
86. See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 4607 (West 1983 and Supp. 1990) (mandatory mediation in child
custody); Civil Justice Reform Act, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Raduction Plans 28 U.S.C. §
471 (1990) (mandated study of and suggested use of ADR to reduce delay in federal courts).
87. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 199.
88. The Northern District of California federal court, for example. directs cases to an Early
Neutral Evaluation process which is just such a hybrid between a settlement conference, mediation
and negotiation, see Wayne Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-SponsTored ADR Programs: Why
They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver and Whether They Threaten Important Values,
1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 303 (1990).
89. For an inquiry not unlike that conducted by the MacCrate committee and one fraught with
many similar problems, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Measuring the Art and Science of Mediation, 9
Negotiation J. 321 (1993). For examples of efforts to specify standardh. see Honeyman, Guidelines
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MacCrate committee demonstrates its commitment to old ways of
solving legal problems by not even educating itself enough about these
significant changes in the legal system. I do not mean to belabor the
absence of attention to my own field, but rather to use it to illustrate the
dangers of the specification of such detailed standards that immediately
date the functioning of lawyers. 90 As the increasing complexity of
conventional legal problems (like environmental siting and
responsibility) and global disputes makes clear, problems are no longer
bi-polar9' and will need to employ different methods than adversarial
presentations for resolutions.92
Though the MacCrate Report and Kronman's book attempt to specify
"timeless" standards of lawyering, both are flawed in their focus on the
status quo and inability or unwillingness to look to the lawyer's work of
the future. As both suggest that the lawyer is a problem-solver, focused
on cases, facts, persuasion and advocacy, they fail to elaborate a broader
and potentially more "timeless" conception of the lawyer's work and
legal education.
V. LAWYERING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: COGNITIVE,
BEHAVIORAL, AFFECTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND
TECHNICAL COMPETENCE
Were I designing an educational program for lawyers of the twenty-
first century (and this Symposium offers me a brief opportunity to do so)
for Mediation Performance and Evaluation, 9 Negotiation J. 295 (1993); ABA Family Law Section,
Ethics Standards for Mediators, Institute for Judicial Administration and the Center for Dispute
Settlement, Standards for Court-Connected ADR Programs, ACLU Guidelines for Use of ADR;
ABA, AAA, SPIDR, Joint Committee on Standards of Conduct for Mediators (1993).
90. No doubt other areas of legal work have been left out as well. Would we say in 1994 that a
fundamental skill of lawyering would require some computer literacy and technical skill?
91. Has the bi-polar conception of legal problems been too long under the influence of a "cold-
war" conception of seeing how the world operates? Whether ADR ultimately transforms legal
practice, it is clear that more complex methods of dispute resolution will be essential for world
problem-solving. The litigation oriented lawyer will have a hard time becoming the "lawyer
statesman" that Kronman envisions if the MacCrate standards dominate legal education. Thank you,
Susan Gillig, my colleaque and dear friend at UCLA for countless conversations about the teaching
of lawyering and its relation to larger problem solving in the world.
92. Sitting where I do (writing both in Los Angeles and Washington DC) it is impossible to
conceive of the world in simple plaintiff-defendant terms. The parties are more complex (entities,
splits within plaintiff groups, multi-racial, multi-ethnic individual disputes), the resources may be
scarcer and the needs for creative problem solving that involve and empower multiple parties are
even greater than we ever imagined them.
Washington Law Review
I would attempt a broader (and less detailed) vision of what a lawyer
would need to know. I would attempt a broader engagement of the
lawyer (and the clients the lawyer serves) as a full human being who
needs to be educated on a variety of different levels, and I would leave
the specification of details to be filled in by the needs and requirements
of the times-events, circumstances and changes that we cannot foretell
today. I will briefly outline some of the dimensions of this learning.
A. Cognitive Knowledge
There is, in my view, something to the phrase, "thinking like a
lawyer,"'93 and this skill of parsing cases, "spotting" issues, separating the
holding from the dictum, the relevant from the irrelevant fact, and the
law from the policy must be learned by anyone who calls herself a
lawyer. Yet, unlike Tony Kronman, I do not see the case method as the
only way to train a legal mind. If it, in his words, procures a certain
skepticism for theories and abstractions and general solutions to
problems,94 then the lawyer will have trouble legislating, lobbying and
administering laws, even if he can persuade judges, juries and people on
the other side of transactions. In the twenty-first century lawyers will
also have to solve problems, synthetically and creatively,95 as well as
analytically; they will have to read and write and en.orce statutes. Thus,
they will need a variety of new and more complex skills and new ways of
understanding legal problems. In learning to think creatively and solve
problems, they might draw from such disciplines as engineering,
architecture, and artificial intelligence. In order to understand
wordcraft, lawyers might be as informed by literary criticism as case
reading.96 We will need to offer courses in statutory construction and
legislation, as well as common law subjects. We will need to balance
private law courses with public law courses and we will need to study
processes more inclusively (civil systems including ADR, criminal
systems including plea bargaining). Most importantly, at the intellectual
93. See the excellent descriptions of it in Karl N. Llewellyn's, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law
and Its Study (1960), and Edward Levi's, An Introduction to Legal Rea.oning (1949), as well as the
newest entry in Anthony Kronman's description of the case method. Kronman supra note 3, at
109-12.
94. Kronman, supra note 3, at 154-62.
95. See, e.g., Martin Gardner, Aha! Insight (1978); James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A
Guide to Better Ideas (3d ed. 1990).
96. See, e.g., Richard Weisberg, Three Lessons From Law and Literature, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
285 (1993).
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level, the well-educated lawyer will need to understand basic economic
concepts97, statistics, and enough social science to be able to analyze
empirical effects of lawmaking and law-enforcing. If we are to take
seriously recent pleas to make lawyers more sensitive to their public
calling,98 then we will need to focus more on moral and political
philosophy as well. Personally, I would recommend a return to the
institutional process courses so popular in the 1960's and 1970's (Hart &
Sacks)99 to instill in law students some policy, historical, and political
sense of institutional competence beyond constitutional separation of
powers. In short, the intellectual or cognitive aspects of learning to be a
lawyer will continue to include what is best about the first year case
system but will have to expand to make room for the "liberal arts" of
lawyering as well. The modem law school will, of necessity, have to be
a "law and.. ." school.
B. Behavioral/Experiential/Skills Trainingt00
The well-educated lawyer of the twenty-first century will also be
educated about "doing like a lawyer," while in law school, as well as in
continuing education programs. In this, I support the basic thrust of the
MacCrate Report-skills must first be introduced in the law school
setting,'0 ' where theories about skills can be developed and tested, where
students can "experiment" with their behavioral repertoires without
hurting real people (in simulation settings), and where feedback is
connected to educational goals and not to client and economic incentives.
This will require a reordering of some priorities-behavior and action
97. Some law schools, like Columbia, already require first year students to systematically study
economics; others like Chicago and George Mason have it dominate the intellectual
environment--do students know what "brand" of law they are learning?
98. See American Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A
Blueprint for Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986); Kronman, supra note 3, at 354-381.
99. See Hart and Sacks, supra note 32.
100. Is there any significance to the fact that skills is always paired to "training", while cognitive
learning is paired with teaching? The hierarchy of sentiments expressed in this wording seems both
sociologically and intellectually false. There is as much "training" in Socratic dialogue and case
reading as there is in interviewing skills teaching and students probably feel that there is not enough
"training" (with implied notions of feedback and repetition) in any form of legal education. For a
description of how professional education could borrow productively from the sports concept of
"coaching," see Schon, supra note 28.
101. I hear the calls of my deans and others complaining that resources are not adequate for such
teacher-student intensive ratios, but alas, I believe we must find the resources. Legal education is the
"cheapest' form of graduate education in terms of the person-power attached to students in the
learner role.
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will have to be treated as seriously as minds and ideas. What a radical
idea!
In my ideal educational system, foundational skills will be learned
first, as foundational concepts are taught first in the cognitive program.10 2
Student-lawyers will learn the constituent aspects of lawyering first-the
logic of question-framing-when an open question, when a closed;
opinion writing, then persuasive writing, and then active listening and
interactive skills with other people, such as collaboration.0 3 Then these
foundational skills can be broadened to particular lawyering
tasks-argument in trial, discussion in negotiation, argument at appeal,
counseling individual clients, counseling organizations and entities,
negotiating disputes, negotiating transactions, negotiating in dyads,
negotiating with coalitions, negotiating with clients and adversaries, and
negotiating with legislatures, government agencies, and foreign
governments. In short, skills training would be organized functionally
and contextually with building blocks going from the specific and
individual to the more complex and diverse. Students would begin in the
first week of law school with an interview"° to understand the relation of
facts to law and skills to context." 5 They would go on to simulation
based basic skills courses in the constituent skills (questioning-
interviewing, advising-counseling, writing, research-ing); then to more
complex skills (negotiation, fact investigationi, trial advocacy,
mediation), and finally to "real case" clinics, as is the norm in other
forms of professional education-medical, clinical psychology, social
work, and some forms of management education, as well as education
itself. In law, this sequencing would tie "process" knowledge of skills to
simultaneous learning of "substantive" doctrine.
In my ideal world, after law school graduation, the lawyer of the
twenty-first century would not only be required to take continuing
education courses about changes in the substantive law, but would have
102. For another expression of the importance of sequencing legal education, see Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy (1983).
103. Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Productive Process for a
Diverse Profession, 17 Vt. L. Rev. 459 (1993).
104. As Northwestern has done in its combination legal writing-clinical program and as is
commonly done in many medical schools today.
105. Both UCLA and NYU have attempted programs in the first year, called Lawyering Process
that focus on this kind of integrated learning. See, e.g., John Sexton, The Preconditions of
Professionalism: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century, 52 Mont. L. Rev. 331 (1991); David
Binder, Lawyering Skills Program (memo to UCLA faculty, March 1994).
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on-going skills clinics as well, to brush up on old skills, learn new ones,
and be given feedback on current competency levels.
Cognitive and skills learning would be unified"° in courses that
combine learning about doctrine and theory while watching the "law in
action" and the "gap" between the law on the books 7 and the law as it
happens. Because I truly believe that participatory learning (role-
playing, problem methods, skills exercises) 8 is what makes learning
stick"° and illuminates how the law is effectuated, it would be used in
virtually every course in legal and continuing education.
C. Affective Human Learning
What is most missing for me in the MacCrate Report and in legal
education is any systematic teaching and learning about what has been
called "the human arts of lawyering."" To the extent that most lawyers
spend most of their time with people there is insufficient attention given
to the arts (and science"') of interacting with others. Kronman points
out that the ability to be "sympathetic" to the client is an essential part of
lawyering. Unlike others who write about lawyering and the legal
profession, he believes it can be, unlike intuition, "discursively
explicated.""' 2 He suggests that the good lawyer must develop an
"imagination" for considering the world view and values and choices of
the person whom one is trying to help (the client).
106. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in
the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1995 (1993).
107. Richard Abel, Law Books and BooksAbout Law, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 175 (1973).
108. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical
Education as Methodology in Clinical Education for the Law Student 374 (1973).
109. For that I will be eternally grateftul to David Filvaroff, who as one of my first year teachers at
the University of Pennsylvania, taught torts and judicial process, in part through simulations and
role-plays, long before clinical education knew what to call these educational modes. It is because
of this experience as a student that I became a clinical teacher and proudly continue to use
participatory learning in all of my courses, no matter what the subject matter.
110. Gary Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27 J. of
Legal Ed. 5 (1975-76).
111. See, e.g., work in neurolinguistics on human interaction; Don Peters, Forever Jung: The
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Learning Negotiation, 42 Drake L. Rev. 1 (1993); Deborah
Tannen, You Just Don't Understand (1991)
112. Kronman, supra note 3, at 66.
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Thus, lawyers must learn how to "feel with" others." 3 This process,
which I call "empathy training," is an essential part of the client-lawyer
relationship and like Kronman, I believe it can be taught and learned. I
distinguish sympathy from empathy and suggest that lawyers need to
learn to experience "the other" from the values that the other holds, not
those of the lawyer-this is the challenge of most lawyer-client relations
and lawyer-opposing side relations. While I and others have called this
an "ethic of care" in other contexts,114 what I mean is a willingness to
truly apprehend the reality of the other (be it client or administrative
bureaucrat or opposing counsel); not just to understand instrumentally
how to move, persuade or affect that person, but to understand what
meaning the interaction has for that person in a caring and existential
sense. The lawyer who hopes to effectuate a successful transaction or
settle a lawsuit or amend an administrative regulation needs to
understand what the goals and feelings of the other are, if only to
effectuate the needs and goals of the client (the "instrumental"
justification for affective learning). I prefer to take ,fhis a step beyond the
instrumental to suggest that the good lawyer needs to understand, from a
human point of view, what the other wants to happen in the world (the
"humanist" justification for affective learning).
While a position of openness and non-judgmentalism should at least
begin the relationship, there will be occasions later for evaluation,
judgment, and what Kronman calls "detachment." 'For me the reason for
a human approach to lawyering is that it is what motivates at least some,
if not all, to come to law-to improve the human condition and to serve
other human beings. To do this effectively means to connect to human
beings beyond the instrumentalism of the professional relationship.
What the lawyer cannot understand she cannot serve.
On the intellectual level, it comes as no surprise -to me that we feel the
pull toward narrative and stories at this time in law, when counterweights
in legal scholarship and scholarship in general have led us to the
abstractions and emptiness of "efficiencies" and "deconstruction." We
seek to reconnect to the people who are affected by law. Even Tony
Kronman, who approaches his subject from a far more conservative (in
the sense of accepting and justifying the status quo) position than I,
suggests that what distinguishes law from other disciplines is that it
113. I have explored the importance of empathy in lawyering and legal education in three contexts
and it is the crux of my teaching in mediation and negotiation course;, see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 12; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 91.
114. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 59; Ellman, Tronto, stpra note 59.
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focuses on the cases of real people and uses theory in service to solving
cases and problems, instead of using cases only to substantiate or falsify
theories.
Kronman's formulation of the need to adopt a "bifocal" view of
compassion and detachment in order to determine what is best to do in a
situation illustrates what he means by developing prudential or practical
wisdom. The general principles of law and skills suggest possibilities to
us, which then must be tested by the particular individuals situated in a
problem. What is important in Kronman's formulation is that his image
reminds us that professionals must be able to hold two ideas together at
once-for those of us who tend to be too compassionate and overly
connected to those we help,"' some detachment will be necessary; for
others who do not know how to connect to other human beings,
lawyering education should teach us how to cross that human divide.
While the MacCrate Report genuflects to the instrumental importance
of communication as a skill, it fails to consider how this is actually to be
accomplished. We are just beginning in legal education to take account
of how to teach the human arts-we are, in short, about where general
lawyering skills education was twenty years ago. New developments,
such as mediation courses and greater emphasis on ethics and even law
office management may provoke more attention and greater
sophistication with respect to these issues in the future.
For the lawyer of the twenty-first century, I would add another form
of affective learning-that is attention to the issues that the
diversification of our profession and the world present to us in learning
how to "feel with" others who are different from the often assumed
homogenous world of lawyers and clients.116 "Diversity training" may
be a current buzz-word of management courses, but in a discipline and
profession devoted to civil rights and justice, learning how "to live
together and get along" should be a particular province of the lawyer and
legal education.
115. This is true for many, but not all, women, see Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (1982);
Anita Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (1987); Tronto, supra note 59.
116. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multi-Racial Society,
81 Cal. L. Rev. 863 (1993).
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D. Normative Learning
The lawyer of the twenty-first century needs to consider the ethical
and moral implications of her work. Whether she begins from the
starting point of the formal rules (as the MacCrate Report would have her
do) or from the tenets of Kant's categorical imperative, the lawyer must
learn to consider the consequences of what s.he does-how does
lawyering work and decisionmaking affect the client, those near the
client, and the larger society. What others label "civic mindedness" or
public accountability, I simply call "ethical consequentialism"--the
lawyer must learn to consider what are the effects of her work-is she
doing more good than harm? These are not easy questions to answer in
concrete situations, and neither legal education nor continuing education
will provide all the answers, but law schools can instill in the neophyte
lawyer an ethical methodology or series of questions that the lawyer can
learn to ask herself and think about posing to clients who may need to
consult equivalent concerns about how their actions impact on the
"public good.'. 7  Whether one employs one of the metatheories of
human nature or the more commonly studied "mixed motive" theories of
today,'18 an awareness of the effects of legal work is consistent with both
a normative approach to the use of one's skills, as well as to the
instrumental aspects of "rational choice" theory. Costs must be balanced
against benefits. The lawyer seems particularly well suited to acting as a
referee between individual and community or polity interests, as well as
to mediate when interests conflict, translate whert ends and means are
confused, and deliberate when ends and means must be chosen by those
who seek different goals. While I take no formal substantive position
here on the goals of normative discourse (unlike Kronman, for example,
who expresses the goal of lawyers as facilitating political fraternity and
community life) beyond a form of utilitarianism (that the goals of
lawyering are to make the most of what we have to create a more just
world for the greatest number), I do believe that ethical "education" is
necessary, if not sufficient, for those entrusted with a public
profession." 9
117. See, e.g., Harry Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1148 (1990).
118. See, e.g., Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest (1989).
119. In my view ethics education must go beyond the formal rules to consider the moral
underpinnings of our actions, see, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice and Thomas Shaffer,
Lawyers and Their Communities (1992) for some illustrations of this inquiry.
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E. Technical Competence
While I hesitate to end with the most banal of suggestions, it is clear
to me that both the MacCrate Report and Kronman's, The Lost Lawyer,
look backward to a false "nostalgia" of the nineteenth-century
conception of the lawyer as an independent professional facilitating
client ends. Today's lawyers are most often employees in large
organizations working with computers, faxes, telephones, and modems,
not just in the United States, but all over the globe. We must not only be
competent in these new technologies, but we must also consider how to
"control" our production of these technologies before they control us.
What are the ethical consequences of faxes making information available
instantaneously to many people? What are the consequences of access to
information on computers? What are the consequences of lawyers' acts
which facilitate the use of deadly technological advances in science and
industry? As the artifacts of human invention increase in their capacity
to do harm, what role should the lawyers play? Technical training
cannot prevent bad things from happening, but lawyers need to
understand the consequences of the technical advances of our society.
What will/should happen to legal work with telecommuting, the "virtual
office," and the increased access of work to the home? Should lawyers
be significantly involved in the issues of how technology will affect the
quality of their lives, 2 ' as well as those of their clients?
VI. CONCLUSION
That the profession should be interested in "narrowing the gap"
between the profession and education is a concern I share. As a skills
teacher who believes we learn best when more than one of our senses is
engaged, I applaud the push for more diversity in our teaching
techniques and in our attempt to "cover" more of what lawyers actually
do. Nevertheless, the well rounded lawyer of the twenty-first century
will need to be proficient and competent in a much broader set of skills
and competencies than the MacCrate Report has touched on. Both
lawyers and the legal academy need to understand the positive
relationship between the "science" and "art" of lawyering, just as both
scholars and practitioners must realize there is a much closer connection
between theory/doctrine and skills than we can often imagine. I firmly
120. See Juliet Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure (1991).
Technology produces flexibility, but it also permits work to intrude on more and more of our lives.
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believe we can only narrow the gap by widening our mutual
purview-we must learn "and-and" thinking in the legal profession, not
"either/or thinking."''
121. See Emily Levine, "Dualisms"-A Comedy Presentation at Women & Work Conference,
UCLA Institute of industrial Relations, Dec. 6, 1993.
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